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Teacher Education and the New Biology 
 
Abstract 
 
Recent years have seen a growth not only in biological knowledge but also, and more 
significantly for teacher education, in the types of knowledge manifested in biology. 
No longer, therefore, is it adequate for teachers to retain a Mertonian or a Popperian 
conception of science. Today's teachers of science need also to be able to help their 
students discuss bioethics and the societal implications of biology, even when these 
are controversial and contested. Moreover, practical work can no longer be confined 
to ‘pure’, ‘safe’ and ‘confined’ activities. These are increasingly rejected by students, 
validly, as boring or irrelevant. Instead, we need to help student undertake a range of 
activities that help them to develop criticality and the potential for action. While some 
may see this as an attack on science, I would argue that this attitude is akin to those 
who once held that religious education (in countries that permit it) should confine 
itself to ‘the faith’. 
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Teacher Education and the New Biology 
 
 
Introduction 
 
I want to begin by describing a view of science education that I believe is still 
prevalent but is outdated. An intentionally rather simple view will be presented, not 
because I believe that my case relies on a caricature against which to stand, but 
because something of a caricature will help point the way I want to argue. Having 
produced this prevalent, but I argue outdated, view of science education, I first 
critique it, secondly suggest how we can have a richer view of science and of science 
education, particularly biology education, and thirdly consider how teacher education 
might respond. 
 
The prevalent but outdated view of science education goes as follows: 
 
Science is a wonderful way of understanding the world. The last few hundred 
years have seen a fantastic growth in scientific knowledge and this has allowed 
new technologies to be developed. These new technologies have enabled people 
to live longer and to control their lives to a greater extent (through the 
widespread availability of such things as transport, lighting and heating). The 
job of science education is to introduce young people to the fundamentals of 
scientific knowledge so that if they go on to study science after school they will 
have the necessary basics for further knowledge and understanding and if they 
do not so that that they will know enough to understand the various scientific 
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issues that affect their lives and over which they have some choice, such as 
whether they should vaccinate their children, avoid excessive use of mobile 
phones and generate fewer carbon dioxide emissions. 
 
 
What, for today’s biology educator, is wrong with this vision of science 
education? 
 
What is wrong with this vision of science education is not so much what it says – I 
would disagree with almost none of its assertions taken in isolation – but what it does 
not say. In contradistinction, the following points can be asserted:  
 Science teaching needs to acknowledge the extent to which scientists do not 
simply discover scientific truths. 
 Biology teaching is generally better introduced through contexts than through 
fundamentals. 
 Today’s biology raises a wide range of ethical issues. 
 Biology teaching sometimes needs to result in more than understanding – it 
should develop the potential for action. 
 
 
Science teaching needs to acknowledge the extent to which scientists do not 
simply discover scientific truths 
 
While historians tell us that what scientists study changes over time, there are 
reasonable consistencies: 
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 Science is concerned with the natural world and with certain elements of the 
manufactured world – so that, for example, the laws of gravity apply as much 
to artificial satellites as they do to planets and stars. 
 Science is principally concerned with how things are rather than with how 
they should be.  So there is a science of gunpowder and in vitro fertilisation 
without science on its own telling us whether warfare and test-tube births are 
good or bad. 
 
However, there is more controversy about precisely how science is done and about 
the extent to which scientific knowledge exists independently of those who produce it 
(e.g. Reiss, 2005). A useful point to start is with the views of Robert Merton and Karl 
Popper. 
 
Robert Merton characterised science as open-minded, universalist, disinterested and 
communal (Merton, 1973).  For Merton, science is a group activity: even though 
certain scientists work on their own, all scientists contribute to a single body of 
knowledge accepted by the community of scientists.  There are certain parallels here 
with art, literature and music. After all, artists often exist in movements so that, for 
example, communities of artists made up the fauvists, the impressionists, the pre-
Raphaelites and the surrealists.  But while it makes no sense to try to combine the 
paintings of the painters within any of these movements, science is largely about 
combining the contributions of many different scientists to produce an overall 
coherent model of one aspect of reality.  In this sense, science is disinterested; in this 
sense it is (or should be) impersonal.  
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Of course, individual scientists are passionate about their work and often slow to 
accept that their cherished ideas are wrong.  But science itself is not persuaded by 
such partiality.  Time shows which of two or more alternative scientific theories is 
nearer the truth. For this reason, while scientists need to retain ‘open mindedness’, 
always being prepared to change their views in the light of new evidence or better 
explanatory theories, science itself advances over time. As a result, while some 
scientific knowledge (‘frontier science’) is contentious, much scientific knowledge 
can confidently be relied on: it is relatively certain. We do know more about genetics 
now than we did 30 years ago and the geneticists of 30 years ago knew more than the 
geneticists of 60 years ago, and so on. 
 
Karl Popper emphasised the falsifiability of scientific theories (Popper, 1934/1972).  
Unless you can realistically imagine collecting data that would allow you to refute a 
theory, the theory isn’t scientific.  The same applies to scientific hypotheses.  So the 
hypothesis ‘All swans are white’ is scientific because we can imagine finding a bird 
that is manifestly a swan (in terms of its appearance and behaviour) but is not white.  
Indeed this is precisely what happened when early white explorers returned from 
Australia with tales of black swans. The criterion ‘whiteness’ was soon dropped from 
the definition of ‘swans’. 
 
Popper’s ideas easily give rise to a view of science in which knowledge steadily 
accumulates over time as new theories are proposed and new data collected to 
discriminate between conflicting theories.  Much school experimentation in science is 
Popperian in essence: we note that the pH of the stomach is very different from that of 
the ileum and hypothesise that enzymes found in the stomach will differ in their 
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optimal pHs compared with enzymes found in the ileum. We test this by 
experimentally determining the optimal pHs of pepsin and a lipase and find that our 
hypothesis is confirmed.  Until some new evidence causes it to be falsified, we accept 
it. 
 
There is much of value in the work of Thomas Merton and Karl Popper but most 
academics who work in the history, philosophy or sociology of science would argue 
that there is more to the nature of science. Thomas Kuhn made a number of seminal 
contributions but he is most remembered nowadays by his argument that while the 
Popperian account of science holds well during periods of normal science when a 
single paradigm holds sway, such as the Ptolemaic model of the structure of the solar 
system (in which the Earth is at the centre) or the Newtonian understanding of motion 
and gravity, it breaks down when a scientific crisis occurs (Kuhn, 1970).  At the time 
of such a crisis, a scientific revolution happens during which a new paradigm, such as 
the Copernican model of the structure of the solar system or Einstein’s theory of 
relativity, begins to replace the previously accepted paradigm.  The central point is 
that the change of allegiance from scientists believing in one paradigm to their 
believing in another cannot, Kuhn argues, be fully explained by the Popperian 
account of falsifiability. 
 
Kuhn likens the switch from one paradigm to another to a gestalt switch (when we 
suddenly see something in a new way) or even a religious conversion.  As Alan 
Chalmers puts it: 
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There will be no purely logical argument that demonstrates the superiority of 
one paradigm over another and that thereby compels a rational scientist to make 
the change. One reason why no such demonstration is possible is the fact that a 
variety of factors are involved in a scientist’s judgment of the merits of a 
scientific theory. An individual scientist’s decision will depend on the priority 
he or she gives to the various factors. The factors will include such things as 
simplicity, the connection with some pressing social need, the ability to solve 
some specified kind of problem, and so on. Thus one scientist might be attracted 
to the Copernican theory because of the simplicity of certain mathematical 
features of it. Another might be attracted to it because in it there is the 
possibility of calendar reform. A third might have been deterred from adopting 
the Copernican theory because of an involvement with terrestrial mechanics and 
an awareness of the problems that the Copernican theory posed for it. 
(Chalmers, 1999, pp. 115-16) 
 
Kuhn also argued that scientific knowledge is validated by its acceptance in a 
community of scientists. Often scientists change their views as new evidence 
persuades them that a previously held theory is wrong. But sometimes they cling 
obstinately to cherished theories. In such cases, if these scientists are powerful (e.g. 
by controlling which papers get published in the most prestigious journals), scientific 
progress may be impeded – until the scientists in question retire or die. 
 
Kuhn’s views about the way in which scientists work helped give rise to a great 
increase in work in this area. Some of this was empirical, so that ethnographic studies 
were undertaken on scientists in laboratories and elsewhere to see what they actually 
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did; some of it was historical; some of it conceptual. A particularly valuable 
contribution was provided by Lakatos (1978). Lakatos argued that scientists work 
within research programmes. A research programme consists of a set of core beliefs 
surrounded by layers of less central beliefs. Scientists are willing to accept changes to 
these more peripheral beliefs so long as the core beliefs can be defended. So, in 
biology, we might see in contemporary genetics a core belief in the notion that 
development proceeds via a set of interactions between the actions of genes and the 
influences of the environment. At one point, it was thought that the passage from 
DNA to RNA was unidirectional. Now we know (reverse transcriptase, etc.) that this 
is not always the case. The core belief (that development proceeds via a set of 
interactions between the actions of genes and the influences of the environment) 
remains unchanged but the less central belief (that the passage from DNA to RNA is 
unidirectional) is abandoned. 
 
Lakatos’ distinction between core and peripheral beliefs can, I would argue, be useful 
in understanding how curricula, including school science curricula, change over time. 
When I started studying science at school in England in the 1960s the key 
components of the curriculum were practical work (whether by pupils or 
demonstrations by teachers) and a body of knowledge and understanding in biology, 
chemistry and physics. There have been changes over the last 40 years, notably: 
 New content (earth sciences, astronomy, some contemporary aspects of 
biology, chemistry and physics) 
 Less emphasis on discovery learning in practical work 
 More applied science 
 More treatment of the social and ethical aspects of science. 
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However, these feel like changes at the periphery. It would not, I feel, take long for a 
good science teacher of 40 years ago to be a good science teacher today. Nor would 
the science lessons of yesteryear seem incomprehensible to bright pupils of today. 
 
My vision of school biology, and the teacher education that is needed to prepare 
teachers to teach it, still has at its core teaching about life. However, I would like to 
argue for the following shifts in emphasis: 
 A great use of contexts for the introduction of biological concepts 
 A great emphasis on ethical issues 
 A deeper understanding of what it is to be human 
 Education for action as well as for knowledge and understanding. 
  
 
Biology teaching is generally better introduced through contexts than through 
fundamentals 
 
Much of school science has the reputation of being difficult, dull, out-of-touch with 
students’ aspirations and irrelevant to society as a whole (Osborne et al., 2003). 
Specifications have traditionally been constructed from a scientist’s viewpoint with 
the concepts being developed in a pattern that is seen to be sensible by a scientist. So, 
for example, courses for 16-19 year-olds might start with biochemistry and cell 
biology and go onto such topics as physiology, genetics, ecology and evolution. But 
many students see things differently and want teachers to show them why the concept 
is important. One possibility is to make the context – or storyline – the driving force. 
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To a certain extent, the case study / storyline approach is already used by some 
authors and within some advanced level biology specifications, particularly within 
certain optional modules (e.g. ‘Applications of genetics’ and ‘Food technology’). 
However, this approach, of learning through contexts, has been taken much further in 
the Salters-Nuffield Advanced Biology (SNAB) project that I direct (Reiss, in press). 
Salters-Nuffield Advanced Biology is a new advanced level biology course for 16-19 
year-olds. It is being launched in England and Wales from September 2005; from 
September 2002 it has been piloted with around 4000 students. Salters-Nuffield 
Advanced Biology aims to produce a coherent course that will enthuse students and 
teachers / lecturers by portraying an up-to-date indication of what it is like to use 
contemporary biology in research, in industry and in everyday life. 
 
Throughout the course, biological principles are studied in the context of real life 
applications of biology, thus making the content more relevant to students. Having 
decided on the outline structure of the course, namely five topics at AS and four at A2 
for the pilot (subsequently modified to four topics at AS and four at A2 for the roll out 
version to start in September 2005), the contexts to be included were considered. This 
process was informed by the many discussions with biologists and advanced level 
biology teachers / lecturers. The contexts needed to be topical, of interest to the 
students, but also enduring. For this reason we were reluctant to have too much on 
recent or (then) currently newsworthy ‘crises’ in biology, such as BSE (bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy), the MMR (measles, mumps, rubella) vaccine  or foot-
and-mouth disease, for fear that these might date quickly. On the other hand, contexts 
like global climate change, genetic engineering and cystic fibrosis are likely to be 
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around for many years to come. Ten potential contexts were selected and presented at 
the UK’s Association for Science Education Annual Meeting in January 2001. The 
comments received were positive and also helped us decide on the best order for the 
topics. 
 
We have attempted throughout the course to make it as likely as possible that students 
engage with the issues, examine them critically and are able to develop their own 
opinions, substantiated by evidence. For instance, in topic 4 we use the evidence 
concerning global climate change as a way of allowing us to introduce the issue of 
what constitutes a valid scientific hypothesis and why. This should help students 
appreciate that there can be alternative explanations for scientific observations. In this 
topic we don’t assume or insist that current climate change is caused by humans. We 
first examine the evidence that the climate really is changing; we then examine the 
evidence that this change is driven by human actions rather than being natural. For 
much the same reason we end Topic 4 with an analysis of the way in which different 
websites present data on climate change to illustrate the point that scientific 
conclusions about controversial issues can sometimes depend on who is reaching the 
conclusions. 
 
A number of reasons can be given for which teaching in context makes sense. For a 
start, it motivates students. Although our data are largely anecdotal it seems that the 
drop out rate in Salters-Nuffield Advanced Biology is smaller than is typically the 
case in advanced level biology courses and that one reason for this is that students can 
see why they are studying what they are studying. For example, topic 2 includes some 
quite conventional material on transport across membranes and Mendelian 
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inheritance. However, it does so in the context of cystic fibrosis and a scenario in 
which a couple at risk of cystic fibrosis are trying to decide whether or not to have a 
baby. Unsurprisingly, the average 16-19 year-olds finds this a relevant and engaging 
question that allows simple inheritance and the movement of water and other 
substances across membranes to be covered in a meaningful context. 
 
But there is a second and somewhat deeper point that can be made and that is that the 
history of science suggests that much fundamental work in biology is context-driven. 
Today, governments and private companies (for example in the pharmaceutical 
industry) spend huge amounts of money on applied research. Often such applied 
research leads to fundamental scientific advances but it is a mistake to think that the 
path from fundamental science to technology is simple and unidirectional. Teaching 
through contexts may often be a more realistic way of modelling the way scientific 
knowledge is produced. 
 
 
Today’s biology raises a wide range of ethical issues 
 
Few would deny that today’s biology raises a wide range of ethical issues. One only 
has to think of in vitro fertilisation, therapeutic cloning, genetic engineering, global 
climate change, conservation, animal experimentation and end-of-life issues to 
appreciate that. But what precisely might be the aims of teaching ethics to biology 
students? Based on Davis (1999), at least four can be suggested (Reiss, 1999). 
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First, such teaching might heighten the ethical sensitivity of participants. For example, 
students who have never thought about whether certain breeds of dogs should have 
their tails removed (‘docked’) or whether a fetus that is not capable of feeling 
anything can be said to have rights might be encouraged to think about such issues. 
Such thinking can result in students becoming more aware and thus more sensitive. It 
is not unusual, as a result, to find students saying ‘I hadn’t thought of that before’. 
 
Secondly, such teaching might increase the ethical knowledge of students. The 
arguments in favour of this aim are much the same as the arguments in favour of 
teaching any knowledge – in part that such knowledge is intrinsically worth 
possessing, in part that possession of such knowledge has useful consequences. For 
example, appropriate teaching about the issue of rights might help students to 
distinguish between legal and moral rights, to understand something of the 
connections between rights and duties and to be able to identify fallacies in arguments 
for or against the notion of animal rights. 
 
Thirdly, such teaching might improve the ethical judgement of students. As Davis, 
writing about students at university, puts it: 
The course might, that is, try to increase the likelihood that students who apply 
what they know about ethics to a decision they recognize as ethical will get 
the right answer. All university courses teach judgment of one sort of another. 
Most find that discussing how to apply general principles helps students to 
apply those principles better; many also find that giving students practice in 
applying them helps too. Cases are an opportunity to exercise judgement. The 
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student who has had to decide how to resolve an ethics case is better equipped 
to decide a case of that kind than one who has never thought about the subject. 
(Davis, 1999, pp. 164-5) 
 
Fourthly, and perhaps most ambitiously, such teaching of ethics might make students 
better people in the sense of making them more virtuous or otherwise more likely to 
implement normatively right choices. For example, a unit on ethics for biology 
students might lead the students to reflect more on the career possibilities open to 
them, leading them to be less pressured by the views of others. There is, within the 
field of moral education, a substantial literature both on ways of teaching people to 
‘be good’ and on evaluating how efficacious such attempts are (e.g. Wilson, 1990; 
Carr, 1991; Noddings, 1992). Here it suffices to note that while care needs to be taken 
to distinguish between moral education and moral indoctrination, there is considerable 
evidence that moral education programmes can achieve intended and appropriate 
results (e.g. Straughan, 1988; Bebeau, Rest & Narvaez, 1999). 
 
 
A deeper understanding of what it is to be human 
 
One of the unfortunate things about recent reforms to school biology curricula in 
England and Wales has been the increasing extent to which organisms other than 
humans are marginalised. However, what is just as sad is that what is generally taught 
about human biology in school biology lessons is actually a generalised mammalian 
anatomy and physiology (Tunnicliffe & Reiss, 2001). In itself there is nothing wrong 
with pupils knowing how mammals digest, breathe, hear, excrete and so on. But these 
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are not the things that make us truly human. To be human is to possess the most 
remarkable product of evolution in the world: the human brain with its capacity to 
enable us to think, reflect, talk, create and appreciate beauty, display both virtue and 
vice and so on. 
 
Now, I don't expect 11-16 year-olds to be subjected in biology lessons to full-blown 
courses on linguistics, neurobiology, epistemology, aesthetics or moral philosophy. 
But I do think that school biology courses for this age range would be a sight more 
interesting and relevant if within them they found time to tackle such issues as: 
 What do we mean by intelligence? Is there only one sort of intelligence or are 
there multiple intelligences? 
 Are differences between males and females innate or cultural? 
 To what extent is human behaviour the result of selfish genes? Can we be 
truly altruistic? 
 Is life-long marriage natural? Are there right ways to behave sexually? 
 Is there a biological basis to aggression? Can biology tell us anything about 
warfare? 
 What is the best way to learn and why? 
 
 
Biology teaching sometimes needs to result in more than understanding – it 
should develop the potential for action 
 
The question as to the whole purpose of school science education has been widely 
debated in recent years in the science education community. Increasingly it has been 
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agreed that school science education should serve the needs of the whole school 
population (e.g. Millar, 1996). For this reason, scientific literacy, however this term is 
understood, is seen as the prime aim of science teaching (see also Layton et al., 1993; 
Irwin & Wynne, 1996; Hodson, 1998). Generally, scientific literacy is seen as being a 
vehicle to help tomorrow's adults to understand scientific issues (Gräber & Bolte, 
1997). In the West, for example, it might be hoped that a good school science 
curriculum that took scientific literacy seriously would help pupils to understand the 
uncertainties around genetically modified foods, global warming and the radiation 
from mobile ‘phones. 
 
My contention here is that while the scientific literacy movement has much to 
commend it, it still offers too narrow a vision of what science education might 
achieve. For example, science educators in general and biology educators in particular 
need to explore what a science curriculum might be like that took as its premise the 
notion that science education should aim for social justice. This is not to suggest that 
this should be the only aim of school science; rather, that it is an aim that has been 
very greatly underplayed. Biology educators can build on the work of a number of 
authors including Rodriguez (1998), Longbottom & Butler (1999), Roth & Désautels 
(2002) and Barton et al. (2003), all of whom have extended the debate about the aims 
of school science. Situating science education within a framework of social justice 
brings it alongside certain other components of the curriculum. For too long the 
science education debate has been conducted without reference to the wider aims of 
schooling (cf. Marples, 1999). 
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How might school science lessons prepare people for social justice beyond the 
science classroom? Gaell Hildebrand (2001) has argued in favour of what she terms 
‘critical activism’ in science education. She urges that there should be both 
participation in science (doing science) and participation in debates about science 
(challenging science). I agree (Reiss, 2003). It is in doing science that pupils better 
understand how scientific knowledge is formed. It is in enabling pupils critically to 
discuss scientific issues that they not only become better able to understand the scope 
of science but more able to appreciate its potential for good and bad. While some may 
see this as an attack on science, I would argue that this attitude is akin to those who 
once held that religious education (in countries that permit it) should confine itself to 
‘the faith’. 
 
For we live, surely, in an age when the power of science has never been more 
manifest. At the same time it is fortunate that, while many secondary students, and 
their parents before them, have unhappy memories of much of their school science 
education, both students and parents almost universally consider science education to 
be important. In the UK, for example, science is seen as a prestigious subject and 
valued for the understanding it offers (Osborne & Collins, 2000; Reiss, 2000). 
 
However, practical activities can no longer be confined to ‘pure’, ‘safe’ and 
‘confined’ activities. These are increasingly rejected by students, validly, as boring 
and irrelevant. Instead, we need a teacher education that helps student undertake a 
range of activities that can enable them to develop criticality and the potential for 
action. For example, in studying the topic of conservation, one could imagine students 
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actually doing something positive for conservation. Depending on their age they 
might do one or more of the following: 
 Carry out a survey on the extent of litter at various distances from fish shops, 
newsagents, other retail outlets and schools. 
 Calculate food miles and press their school canteen to provide more local 
foods. 
 Construct and maintain a wildlife area in their school grounds. 
 Lobby politicians over a conservation issue. 
 Make a short video clip on a local conservation issue and place it on the 
school web-site. 
 Make a short audio clip about a local conservation issue and send it to a local 
radio station. 
 
For such teaching to avoid being partial, teachers would need to encourage their 
students to debate the pros and cons of such actions and would need to avoid 
pressurising them to engage in such actions. Beginning science (including biology) 
teachers themselves need support in teaching about controversial issues. 
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